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1. The international regime on civil liability for marine oil pollution does provide for sufficient 
compensation in most cases, but when it comes to catastrophic spills, it turns out to be 
inadequate.  
  
2. A limited liability set at a too low level is in principle inefficient in the context of marine oil 
pollution compensation regime, especially when the victims are third parties. However, the 
limitation of liability can be designed in such a way that it is at least to a certain extent risk-
related, whereby it may still give incentives to the actors to take preventive measures. 
 
3. A compensation fund is necessary to provide additional compensation to the pollution victims, 
inter alia for catastrophes.  
 
4. The current funding structure of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC 
Fund) only provides incentives for the parties contributing to the Fund to adapt their activity 
level, but not the level of prevention, because it is only related to the amount of oil transported by 
the contributor, but not related to the preventive measures taken or the safety performance of the 
contributor.  
 
5. The US regime may seem more efficient than the IOPC Fund regime at least from the 
perspective of economic theory, but there is not empirical evidence to support this. 
 
6. Compulsory insurance is a necessary mechanism for catastrophic disasters caused by industrial 
activities, but is not useful for man-made disasters such as terrorist activities.  
 
7. A legal regime that develops as a result of the availability heuristic is not necessarily a bad 
regime. 
 
8. Increased liability burdens on polluters have led to increased preventive effects, but equally to 
more investments by polluters in avoiding to be detected. 
 
9. The best solution to transboundary externalities from a theoretical point of view is to 
implement a cooperative equilibrium, whereby all the externalities are internalized at the global 
level. 
 
10. Although there has been no competition law and hence no anti-monopoly mechanism in 
China until very recently, the Chinese economy has been growing rapidly during the last two 
decades. Therefore, the existence of economic institutions (e.g. competition rules) is not a pre-
condition for the success of an economy. 
 
11. Being a Chinese in China is only one tiny component of the 1,331 million, but as the only 
Chinese resident in the Community of Riemst in Belgium, I am the absolute star.1  
                                                 
1 See Het Belang van Limburg, 2008. 
